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Ambient Intelligence (AmI) evokes a near future in which humans will be 
surrounded by ‘always-on’, unobtrusive, interconnected intelligent objects. One of 
the particular challenges of AmI is that the user will be involved in huge numbers 
of moment-to-moment exchanges of personal data without explicitly sanctioning 
each transaction. This seamless exchange of information has vast social 
implications, in particular the protection and management of personal 
information. As a result, we have recently conducted a wide reaching study of 
people’s attitudes to potential AmI scenarios. This research project investigates 
the concepts of trust and privacy issues specifically related to the exchange of 
health, financial, shopping and e-voting information when using AmI system. The 
findings related to the e-voting scenario will be discussed in this paper.  
1 Ambient Intelligence 
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) refers to the convergence of ubiquitous computing, ubiquitous 
communication, and interfaces that are both socially aware and capable of adapting to the 
needs and preferences of the user. AmI evokes a near future in which humans will be 
surrounded by ‘always-on’, unobtrusive, interconnected intelligent objects, few of which will 
bear any resemblance to the computing devices of today. Mark Weiser (1991) envisaged a 
world where computers would be implanted in nearly every artefact imaginable. A person 
might interact with hundreds of computers at anyone point in time, each device invisibly 
embedded in the environment and wirelessly communicating with each other.  
 
Although this form of intelligent communication is still a vision of the future, we already use 
a host of different technologies to send and receive information and communicate with others. 
When using exisitng technologies to exchange information generally we iniate and control the 
process, know who will receive the information and are aware of the actual message content. 
One of the particular challenges of AmI is that the user will be involved in huge numbers of 
moment-to-moment exchanges of personal data without explicitly sanctioning each 
transaction.  
 
As humans are inherently social beings, and our actions are always directly or indirectly 
linked to other people, how will AmI systems impact upon our social world? Friedewald et al 
(2005) question whether AmI systems will fulfil most of the promises made by researchers or 
whether the vision is just an illusion? Living in an AmI society suggests effortless 
communication, our needs, wants and desires met. The seamless exchange of information has 
vast social implications and might not decrease but actually increase the complexity of life. 
 Two important factors that will influence ambient technology adoption and use are trust and 
privacy issues. Streitz & Nixon (2005) argue ‘areas of security, privacy, and trust are critical 
components for the next stages of research and deployment of ubiquitous systems. Moreover, 
it was identified that these observations are not merely an amplification of the current 
concerns of Internet users with desktop computers. New approaches are required that take 
even more into account regarding both the social and technical aspects of this problem to 
ultimately determine the acceptance of this technology by the general public’ (p.35).  
 
This paper will focus on the social implications of information exchange in an ambient 
society, in particular the use of an e-voting system, and not the technical limitations or 
constraints of such systems. If we consider that the exchange of information is what makes 
AmI tick, we need to ask questions about information that will have a direct impact on both 
trust and privacy, including: Who is receiving it? Who has access? Is the receiver credible, 
predictable and sensitive? Where is the information being sent and received? In what context 
is the device used? Does the user have choice and control? How does the device know whom 
to communicate with e.g. through-personalised agents?  
. 
 
1.1 The Context of E-Voting 
People regularly take part in electronic voting using devices such as mobile telephones and 
Internet linked personal computers.  The type of vote cast is often novel and trivial e.g. 
choosing a contender in a reality television show. When considering use of such systems to 
vote in political elections the concepts of privacy, trust and security need fully understood. 
 
Recently, a number of government’s have begun experimenting with the use of new electronic 
voting (e-voting) systems for the purpose of public elections. In 2002, the United States 
Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (Federal Election Committee 2002) which 
mandated the use of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines in all polling 
stations to support disabled voters who wished to vote without assistance or by proxy. A 
further intention of the move towards DRE machines in the US is to improve the accuracy and 
integrity of vote casting in a relatively complex electoral system, given the experience of 
failures during the 2000 presidential election attributed to other voting systems (Kimball, 
Owens & Keeney 2002). However, the use of DRE machines has proved controversial, with 
many academic, journalists and voting rights advocates arguing that the use of electronic 
voting systems simply hides the evidence of system failures, rather than eliminating the 
problem itself (Gumbel 2005, Dill 2003, Mercuri 2001). Many of such critics advocate the 
introduction of Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT), in essence paper receipts printed 
by the DRE checked by the voter against the electronic representation and used as the final 
arbiter in a disputed count. Others have argued that VVPATs introduce as many problems as 
they are purported to solve, and in particular their crude may violate the privacy of disabled 
voters, if they require assistance in order to verify their vote. 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the government recently conducted a range of pilots of new 
voting systems, including a number of pilots of remote electronic voting (REV) systems (The 
Electoral Commission 2002, 2003). The introduction of remote electronic voting systems 
occurred in the context of a rapidly declining turnout to elections at European, national and 
local levels. In 2001, turnout to the General Election dropped to 59.4%, the lowest since the 
advent of universal suffrage (Electoral Commission 2001). In this context, the major aim of 
the use of these new technologies is to improve the convenience of voting and (it is hoped) 
voter participation and turnout to elections. The piloting of remote electronic systems was 
commonly conducted using a security mechanism proposed by CESG as a simple means of 
vote casting and reassuring voters that their vote had been collected by an Election Authority 
(CESG 2002). However, several commentators and studies identified weaknesses in the 
security mechanism (Mercuri 2002, Kitcat 2002). The pilots of REV systems were generally 
considered to be of mixed success with respect to their primary goal of improving turnout, 
compared with other more established systems such as postal voting. From a technological 
perspective, the pilots were considered relatively successful, with few problems reported 
using the systems, or counting votes. 
 
In the academic community, electronic voting (both remote and polling station based) have 
traditionally been considered as within the remit of cryptography, and in particular an 
example application of a secure multi-party computation. A variety of cryptographic 
constructs have been proposed to support REV systems, including mixnets (Chaum 1981) 
homomorphic schemes (Benaloh 1996) and schemes employing blind signature techniques 
(Fujioka et al 1992). More recently, the use of cryptography has been proposed to support 
polling station DRE systems, including the use of visual cryptography (or similar) to provide 
voters with non-transferable receipts for their votes (Chaum 2004, Chaum et al 2004). In 
addition, the notion of pollsterless remote voting systems has been introduced, which attempt 
to remove the requirement for voters to use trusted software artefacts in order to engage in a 
cryptographic protocol (Malkhi et al 2003). The scenario described in this paper is based on 
one such pollsterless system, mCESG (Storer & Duncan 2004). The current controversy 
regarding DRE machines has also spurred academic interest in voting systems from other 
fields out with cryptography, including dependability (Bryans & Ryan 2003) and usability 
(Laskowski & Quenesbery 2004, Bederson et al 2003, Mercuri 2002) There is now an 
accepted view that research into voting systems has become a multi-disciplinary activity, 
requiring expertise from a multitude of fields. 
2 Method 
To understand and investigate the concept of AmI technology and subsequent use key 
stakeholders provided specific scenarios illustrating the ways in which privacy, trust and 
identity information might be exchanged in the future. The stakeholders included relevant 
user groups, researchers, developers, businesses and government departments with an interest 
in AmI development. Four scenarios were developed, related to health, e-voting, shopping 
and finance that included facts about the device, context of use, type of service or information 
the system would be used for. These scenarios are briefly described below: 
 
E-voting Scenario: Natasha decides she wants to vote in the next election using the new on-
line system. She goes on-line and requests electronic voting credentials. Shortly before 
polling day a polling card and separate security card are delivered to Natasha’s home. They 
arrive as two separate documents to reduce the risk of interception. Natasha picks up two of 
the letters from the doormat and puts the letters in her pocket as she rushes out of the door to 
head for work. While travelling on the local underground railway system Natasha decides to 
cast her vote on her way to work. The letters have provided her with a unique personal voting 
and candidate numbers which allows her to register a vote for her chosen candidate. She 
takes out her mobile phone and types her unique number into it. Her vote is cast by entering 
this unique number into her phone and sending it to a number indicated on the polling card. 
Her phone then shows a text message: THANK YOU FOR VOTING. YOU HAVE NOT BEEN 
CHARGED FOR THIS CALL. When Natasha arrives at work she logs on to the voting site to 
see if her vote has been registered. While at her computer with her polling cards on the desk 
in front of her a colleague looks over her shoulder, she can see that Natasha is checking her 
vote but can’t see who she has voted for. Once the result of the election has been announced 
Natasha checks that the correct candidate name is published next to her unique response 
number to ensure that the system has worked properly. 
2.1 Development of Videotaped Scenarios 
The elicited scenarios were scripted and the scenes were videotaped in context to develop 
Videotaped Activity Scenarios (VASc). The VASc method is an exciting new tool for 
generating richly detailed and tightly focussed group discussion and has been shown to be 
very effective in the elicitation of social rules (Little et., 2004). VASc are developed from 
either in-depth interviews or scenarios, these are then acted out in context and videotaped. 
The VASc method allows individuals to discuss their own experiences, express their beliefs 
and expectations. This generates descriptions that are rich in detail and focussed on the topic 
of interest. For this research a media production company based in the UK was employed to 
recruit actors and videotape all scenarios. The production was overseen by both the producer 
and the research team to ensure correct interpretation. British Sign Language (BSL) and 
subtitles were also added to a master copy of the VASc’s for use in groups where participants 
had various visual or auditory impairments. 
 
2.2 Participants 
The VASc's were shown to thirty-eight focus groups, the number of participants in each group 
ranged from four to twelve people. The total number of participants was three-hundred and 
four. Participants were drawn from all sectors of society in the Newcastle upon Tyne area of 
the UK, including representative groups from the elderly, the disabled and from different 
ethnic sectors. Prior to attending one of the group sessions participants were informed about 
the aims and objectives of the study. Demographic characteristics of all participants were 
recorded related to: age, gender, disability (if any), level of educational achievement, 
ethnicity, and technical stance. A decision was made to allocate participants to groups based 
on: age, gender, level of education and technical stance as this was seen as the best way 
possible for participants to feel at ease and increase discussions. As this study was related to 
future technology it was considered important to classify participants as either technical or 
non-technical. This was used to investigate any differences that might occur due to existing 
knowledge of technological systems. Therefore participants were allocated to groups initially 
by technical classification i.e. technical/non-technical, followed by gender, then level of 
educational achievement (high = university education or above versus low = college 
education or below), and finally age (young, middle, old). Overall this categorization process 
culminated in 24 main groups. Due to poor attendance at some group sessions these were run 
again at a later date. Although several participants with physical disabilities attended the main 
group sessions two group sessions for people with visual and auditory impairments were 
carried out at the Disability Forum in Newcastle. The forum was considered to have easier 
access and dedicated facilities for people with such disabilities. 
 
2.3 Technical Classification 
To classify participants into technical or non-technical six questions based on a categorization 
process by Maguire (1998) were used. Participants answer the questions using a yes/no 
response. Responding yes to questions 1, 3, 5 and 6, no to questions 2 and 4 would give a high 
technical score of 6. If the opposite occurred this would give a low technical score of 0. 
Participants in this study who scored 0-3 where classified as non-technical while participants 
who scored 4-5 as technical.  The questions were: 
 
If your personal devices e.g. mobile telephone or computer were taken away from you 
tomorrow, would it bother you? 
Do you think that we rely too much on technology?                
Do you enjoy exploring the possibilities of new technology?   
Do you think technologies create more problems than they solve?  
Is Internet access important to you?      
Do you like to use innovative technology as opposed to tried and tested technology? 
 
2.4 Procedure 
On recruitment all participants received an information sheet that explained the study and the 
concept of AmI technologies. Participants were invited to attend Northumbria University, UK 
to take part in a group session. The groups were ran at various times and days over a three-
month period. Participants were told they would be asked to watch four short videotaped 
scenarios showing people using AmI systems and contribute to informal discussions on 
privacy and trust permissions for this type of technology. They were told all of the other 
participants in their particular group would be of approximately the same age and gender and 
informed the discussion groups would be recorded for further analysis. Participants were not 
informed about the technical/non-technical or the level of educational achievement 
classification that was used. An informal interview guide was used to help the moderator if 
the discussion deviated from the proposed topic.   
 
At the beginning of each group session the moderator gave an explanation and description of 
AmI technologies. After the initial introduction the first videotaped scenario was shown. 
Immediately after this each group was asked if they thought there were any issues or problems 
they could envisage if they were using that system. The same procedure was used for the 
other three-videotaped scenarios. The scenarios were viewed by all groups in the same order: 
e-voting, shopping, health and finance.  Once all the videos had been viewed an overall 
discussion took place related to any advantage/disadvantages, issues or problems participants 
considered relevant to information exchange in an ambient society. Participant’s attitudes in 
general towards AmI systems were also noted. The duration of the sessions was 
approximately ninety minutes.  
3 Analysis 
All group discussions were transcribed then read; a sentence-by-sentence analysis was 
employed using the Atlas.ti™ qualitative software programme. The data was open coded 
using qualitative techniques and several categories were identified. The data was then grouped 
into categories using sentences and phrases from the transcripts. Categories were then 
grouped into the different concepts, themes and ideas that emerged during the analysis.  
The various themes and concepts that emerged from the analysis provided greater insight into 
the issues regarding information exchange in an ambient society. Different issues related to 
the user, device and stakeholder emerged.  Further in-depth analysis revealed several 
constructs related to dislcosure, privacy, trust and usability issues associated with the use of e-
voting systems. These constructs were compared in relation to the user, device and 
stakeholder. 
Trust concepts 
  a) Crediblity of the stakeholder 
Participants raised concerns over political parties and government using AmI systems to 
monitor voting habits. Participants feared stakeholders would alter, change or add votes. 
Concerns were raised over govenrment having the capacity to create user profiles. This in turn 
would create lifestyle profiles accessible by third parties which would lead to untold 
consequences. 
‘I think I would trust the system providing it was entrusted to the same electoral registration officers 
as it is at the moment.’ 
b) Motivation 
Participants discussed e-voting systems in terms of motivation related to their own use and the 
stakeholder. Advantages for personal use related to convenience, the mobility of the system 
and the concpet of voting verification. Older age groups debated whether e-voting systems 
would encourge younger age groups to vote in elections. Concern was raised that e-voting 
systems would make voting appear a casual event.    Stakeholder motivation was discussed in 
terms of  monitoring votes and voters. Monitoring actual voters was considered a major 
disadvantage. Also concern was raised over stakeholders using such systems to alter and 
change votes.  
 
‘I would say the young ones, because the technology is acceptable to them.  It makes it more relevant 
to today’s youth and more interactive I guess.’ 
 
‘I’m not saying it does happen but with a candidate, if he wants to make sure that is who is elected, he 
could hack in to the voting to play around with the figures.’ 
 
c) Personalisation 
The ability of people to use a perosnal device for voting and use personalised security 
mechanisms e.g. passwords. Also the system and stakeholder’s sensitivity regarding sending 
and receiving personalised information in a timely manner. 
 Discussion revealed participants concerns over systems being truly sensitive to circumstances 
under which personal information could legitimately be exchanged. The transfer of sensitive 
personal information and annonymity were discussed.  Leakage of sensitive information in 
inappropriate circumstances was seen as very problematic: 
‘You punch your number in and press Enter.  They don’t know your number.  That’s the idea of 
personalising it, do you know what I mean. But what I am saying is where does it go from that 
machine, does anybody else contribute, you know access to a big computer with all these numbers in, 
transactions where do they go?’ 
 
‘It does not do anything different; but it would be yours.  So if you are putting the information in it’s 
not going to tell anyone.  If everybody has got one you want to be a little bit different.’  
 
d) Falibility  
Discussion highlighted human fallibility in using an e-voting system, entering numbers and 
losing the device (whilst acknowledging the fact that a truly AmI environment may or may 
not have this problem, we venture to suggest that the loss of something that gives us our 
identity bears similarities to this concern).  Participants were also concerned about making 
mistakes and voting for the wrong person. 
 
‘One is that there has to be a human input somewhere into the system and the reliability of the human 
input is dependent on the adaptability of that human being.  I think we are all intelligent human 
beings, we’re older, we’re wiser than we were some years ago and I think we could all put in 
intelligent information but we can all make mistakes and that is a failing that we have to recognise.’ 
 
e)Reliability  
Pariticpants discussed the relaibility of the system. For example, if the machine malfunctioned 
and the user was unaware of this what would the consequences be? Pariticpants questioned 
whether e-voting systems complicated the voting process and increased the cognitive load on 
the voter compared to existing systems. 
 
‘I think that with something important like the vote, the amount of times that new technology goes 
wrong you are sort of taking a big gamble voting that way.  At least if the cross is on a bit of paper 
and it is counted by another human being, you feel safe that your vote is actually registered in the 
right place.’ 
f) Reliance and responsibility 
Participants discussed the user relying too much on the system to exchange information and 
the responsibility associated with this. 
Participants discussed relying on either the system and/or themselves would be problematic. 
Concern arose over trust in the information received. For example, how would the user be 
assured that his or her vote was actually secure and free from interference from others. 
Participants were also concerned some people would adopt e-voting systems and not consider 
the responsilbity of what it means to cast a vote and who to actually vote for. This in turn 
would reduce the overall level of trust in politcial groups. 
‘I think over dependence on say electronic voting would be very dangerous.’ 
‘The people that are providing the service they have got to get it right; the level of information they 
are passing to one another.  Will that information be protected; how will I know when I pick a device 
up I can trust that device to only do what I said to do; will it be interfered with.’ 
‘They would have to extend the data protection act wouldn’t they so that there was some sort of 
control as to where that information went.  At the moment I don’t think there are, the information can 
just go anywhere.’ 
 
g) Security  
Security of e-voting systems emerged as key factor that would limit adoption and use. 
Fraudulent use, hacking, access by third parties, leakage and storage of information were all 
areas discussed. Participants agreed that being able to verify their vote was a postive aspect of 
the system. However participants did question whether the actual verification process could 
be trusted compared to actually physically voting at a polling station.  
 
‘I think the problem with all new technologies like this is someone comes up with a brilliant idea to 
increase the number of people voting, whatever the motive is, to make it easier to vote on the web.  I 
think where the problem arises is that the safeguards are not always in place or not enough thought 
has been given to the security of that information, when this technology is developed initially.’ 
 ‘I have serious worries about the security of this, because when we go into a booth, they’ve got your 
name, you get a bit of paper, there’s no marking on the paper, you put a cross and you vote in secret, 
but with this, you can trace it and I don’t like it.’ 
 
Privacy concepts 
 
h) Physical privacy 
Participants commented when using e-voting systems physical privacy was a major issue.  
They discussed issues related to leakage of personal information in public settings and other 
people being able to see what they were doing. Participants were also concerned that using 
such systems would lead to surveillance. 
 
‘It’s great that you can sit on the Metro and do it, assuming that nobody is looking over your 
shoulders while you are physically pulling your number.  You couldn’t do it standing up on the 
London Tube for example.’ 
 
i) Informational privacy 
The concept of informational privacy was a major concern for all participants..Participants 
acknowledged stakeholders already hold information about you that you are unaware of and 
this should be made more transparent. Concerns were raised over the probability that 
stakeholders would collect personal information in an ad hoc manner without informing the 
person. Data gathering and data mining by stakeholders would create profiles about a person 
that would contain false information. Participants believed profiling would lead to untold 
consequence. For example, a person might be refused employment as his or her profile states 
which particular political party he or she voted for.   
 
‘It’s (information) where it can lead. That’s the key to a lot of personal information about you, it’s 
telling you where you live, they (3rd parties) can get details from there and there’s companies buying 
and selling that information’. 
 
‘Even if you can justify your answer, they can always find flaws in that, so you really don’t want to tell 
anybody who you voted for.  There could be other personal information where you are voting that 
could leak out.’ 
 
‘I think the only danger with that is if you vote for one of the parties and the other party get in and 
they know that you didn’t vote for them, it could cause all kinds of difficulties do you not think?’ 
 
j) Social privacy 
Participants discussed the possibility that e-voting systems would foster social isolation. 
Although systems would in fact increase social privacy as less human-human interaction 
would take place, this was considered very problematic. The act of actually going to a polling 
station was considered a social event, one in which interaction with others took place. 
Participants also commented in our social world we already leak information to others in the 
form of visual cues e.g. items in your shopping trolley, without any serious implications. In 
the physical world strangers knowing certain information about you is not problematic, 
however people do not want to share the same information with friends e.g. your voting 
preference. In the physical world interactions are considered ‘open’ where people can see 
exactly what is happening compared to the closed nature of the virtual world.  
 
‘I don’t know whether this is because we are primarily discussing technology, I don’t know how far 
this is relevant.  I would not want to see that kind of thing happening in elections for quite different 
reasons.  I think there are areas of life in which technology is inappropriate and politics is an area in 
which there is already too little involvement and too little contact of the individual and the act of 
getting out and voting is as an important thing for an individual citizen to do and I think it would be 
wrong, not wrong, it would be unfortunate that if it is replaced by a little electronic thing that you can 
do in the privacy of your own home it privatises something that should be public and shared.’ 
 
Disclosure  
 
k) Risk and diclosure preferences 
Participants discussed the levels of risk involved when personal information is dislcosed.  
Participants agreed the type of information shared normally depends on who, what, where and 
why, but crucially is informed by the type of relationship they have with the other person. If 
their relationship is close e.g. family then the majority of information is shared quite freely. 
However, sharing even with a close family member depends on situation and context. 
Participants discussed concern over stakeholders sharing personal information with third 
parties, creating profiles, making inferences from personal information and suggested AmI 
systems(including e-voting)  need transparency at times.  
 
‘I don’t know who has got what information.  If I asked anyone are they going to tell me if they didn’t 
want to and how would I know that they were telling me?  So it goes into this kind of vacuum, but they 
are only going to tell me the information they want me to know and they miss the bit that they really 
don’t want me to know, that they do know or not know, I have no way of finding out.’ 
 
Interestingly, visually impaired participants commented they have to generally dislcose 
personal information to family, friends and even strangers when they want to use different 
technologies even when they don’t want to. For example, visually impaired paprticipants 
discussed disclosing personal information when using an automated teller machine. 
 
‘It is not confidential, because if you cannot see the postal vote form, by law the form has got to be of 
a certain size.  It can’t really be enlarged or made bigger.  Some people will actually have to ask 
somebody to do it for them.  So again it is not confidential’ 
 
l) Autonomy (choice and control) 
Participants commented little or even no choice would exist in an AmI society. Comments 
suggested ‘forced choice’ would become the ‘norm’, making people vote electronically even 
if they did not want to. Participants expressed concern over the right not to reveal information 
having vast implications leading to exclusion in some circumstances. 
Participants were concerned about reliance on AmI systems such as e-voting reducing 
personal control. Discussions revealed AmI systems would create ‘Big Brother’ societies that 
lacked control and choice. Concern was raised over how information would be controlled by 
stakeholders, i.e. storage and transmission. 
 
‘What I don’t like is where it starts taking control of that information from your hands and having 
information in an electronic device which fair enough you are supposed to have programmed in the 
first place but once you have programmed it what’s your control over it then and it’s transmitting 
information about you to all these various.  I don’t trust technology enough yet.’ 
 
Usability concepts 
m)Complexity 
Participants discussed concern over the complexity of e-voting systems. Comments related to 
the fact existing technologies are difficult to use. Participants commented the e-voting system 
had several tasks which were time consuming and complicated compared to casting a vote at a 
polling station. Discussion also focused on age differences in technology use, experience and 
familiarity. 
‘I would have thought that there were a number of people, dare I say, probably myself included, who 
would find that type of technology rather difficult.  I find it difficult enough to make a mobile phone 
call.’ 
‘I’m not sure whether I would necessarily use it but it is just getting used to new systems isn’t it, you 
think you are not going to use the things and when they are available you think yes, what a good idea.  
I would worry about having to learn another number and I’m a Maths teacher!  But it drives me mad 
all these security codes and you have got to know so many different ones.’ 
 
n)Exclusion & accessiblity 
Participants commented widespread exclusion would occur if people had to adopt e-voting 
systems. Exclusion would occur due to age, ability, disability and socio-economic status. The 
hearing and visually impaired group in this study found the system very complex and 
commented that it would acutally deter voting. Visually impaied participants discussed 
exclusion due to text messaging and the reduction in physical privacy if audio equipment had 
to be used. 
 
‘Because not everybody has the access to a computer do they.  You see all these old people round my 
place the council estate, in the bungalows, they haven’t got computers.  They wouldn’t know what to 
do with them if they did, so.’ 
 
o)System – type 
All participants agreed the mobility of voting electronically was advantageous and that 
through diffusion adoption would probably occur. Participants commented systems needed to 
be transparent and accessible so information could be verified and changed. Decentralised 
systems were considered more secure than centralised. For example, the amount of votes 
could be acounted for in a decentralised system. 
 
‘The danger in setting up a system like this is that there could be some element of central control in 
this system that is not there either by the present postal voting or by the present going to the polling 
station.’ 
 
‘If they are still keeping their electoral areas, so this information goes to a returning officer, so we are 
not talking about a totally centralized system where all the information goes to London and all the 
results are announced in London.  You don’t have anything like Newcastle’s group of MPs, North 
Tyneside whatever they are will be announced by the returning officers in the respective areas, so if 
the information is being collated that way, I don’t have any problem because you know how many 
voters there are from the electoral role, you know how many votes have been cast.  Half the time you 
find out if there is a glitch in the system because too many people are voting from the population of the 
area or whatever, so there are certain safeguards in that respect.’ 
 
4 Discussion 
To evaluate the social impact of AmI use, trust, privacy and usability need to be understood. 
Findings from this study show use of an e-voting system is affected by trust, privacy, 
dislcosure and usability issues. Also different contexts, stakeholders, device type and the 
actual user all need to be considered. This is important if we are to fully understand user 
interaction with e-voting systems and in particular AmI technologies.  
 
Findings from this research support the view privacy and trust are multidimensional 
constructs with underlying factors that dynamically change according to context. The findings 
support the view of Sillence et al. (2004) in that trust is multidimensional.  
.  
To establish trust and privacy the following questions need to be addressed when related to 
information exchange in an e-voting context: Who is receiving it? Who has access? Is the 
receiver credible, and predictable? Where is the information being sent and received? Does 
the user have choice and control?  
 
Interstingly, although particpants were grouped by technical stance, age, gender and 
educaitional achievement the recurrence of themes across groups were similar. This suggests 
e-voting systems raise similar issues for all relevant users. The majority of participants agreed 
the mobility and convenience were positive aspects of e-voting. However, concern over 
excluded groups with regard to using e-voting systems was frequently discussed. For 
example, discussion highlighted how disabled groups have little or no privacy when using 
technologies as they often have to ask for help from others. In the case of e-voting a visually 
impaired person would have to reveal his or her vote to someone else, this trusted other would 
then vote on his or her behalf.  
 
Participants were also concerned about the ‘behind the scenes’ processing of personal 
information, the complexity and security of the system. The concerns raised by participants 
related to trust in the system and the actual stakeholder e.g. altering votes, third party access 
and explotation. These findings have major implications for AmI systems. Therefore, to 
increase trust AmI systems need to be transparent and decentralised  These findings support, 
the Fair Information Practice-FIP (e.g. Federal Trade Commission of America, 2000) that 
suggests stakeholders should give users: notice, choice, access and security.  
 
For AmI systems to work societies need to be at least somewhat transparent. To be truly 
transparent then we need complete trust and have no concern over privacy. The enigmatic 
nature of trust and privacy questions whether we can really understand this type of puzzle or 
even create a clear vision for future interactions with AmI systems. Findings support the view 
of Friedewald et al (2005) and question whether AmI systems will actually increase the 
complexity of life. 
 
We need to consider the fact humans are inherently social beings and their actions are always 
directly or indirectly linked to other people. Findings from this evaluation raise some 
interesting issues related to human values: Will people begin to rely to heavily on AmI 
technology? Will people be comfortable exchanging all types of information even when of a 
very personal nature? Will the way we socially interact change, and social norms along with 
it? 
 
AmI systems do bring substantial benefits, including convenience and mobility. However the 
disadvantages in our social world might be far greater, e.g. less social interaction, reliance on 
machines, less privacy, and the potential erosion of trust. Distrust and suspicion of AmI 
systems and in particular e-voting, appear key concepts that emerged from the group 
discussions in this study, and bear much further examination and understanding.  
 
Ambient intelligence is now an area intensely researched and undergoing rapid development 
already visible in advanced mobile, PDA and notebook services. The vision of a future filled 
with smart and interacting everyday objects offers a whole range of possibilities. If Weiser’s 
vision is to be realised then we must acknowledge the advantages and disadvantages this 
transformation will have on society. For example, sensor and communication mechanisms in 
the environment will help people with disabilities lead a more independent life. We will be 
able to track everything from children, family, and friends to missing keys. However we must 
question whether the transformation that will take place is ethical or even socially acceptable. 
Do we want or need to rely on embedded devices seamless exchanging information on our 
behalf? 
Clear methodologies that allow in-depth investigation into how information exchange in an 
ambient world can be made trustworthy, secure and private are needed. This requires cross-
disciplinary approaches where evaluation is based on both the technical and social aspects of 
such interactions. 
 
The next stage of this research is to develop a survey from the project findings. The survey 
will be a useful tool in measuring concepts related to trust, privacy and social issues when 
considering ambient devices and information exchange. The findings will give further insight 
into how ambient devices can be designed to deliver specific services and information and 
therefore acceptance. 
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